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The twentieth century has seen the demise of nonphysical theo­
ries ofmind. The Cartesian tradition of mind-body dualism accord­
ing to which "the natures ofmind and body are acknowledged to be 
not only diverse but even, in a manner of speaking, to be the 
contraries of one another," (Descartes, p. 8), today seems quaint to 
most thinkers. Although a few contemporary theorists continue to 
embrace Descartes' view that mind is a nonphysical substance that 
interacts with the (physical) human body,! arguments against dual­
ism "have moved most ... of the professional community to embrace 
some form of materialism" (Churchland, p. 21). 
"Materialism," or "physicalism," is the position that takes our 
modern scientific worldview seriously. The position assumes that 
humans fall unproblematically into the biological world of trees, 
flowers, fish, monkeys and amoeba. The biological world is in tum 
explainable in terms of the dances of elementary bits of matter and 
the forces which play roles in their interaction. "The message of the 
last 300 years of science is that ultimately we--and all else-are 
nothing but swarms of particles" (Sterelny, p. 2).2 
Thus phYSicalism forces us to conclude that human minds-like 
human bodies-fall squarely in the domain of our physical theories. 
The phenomena we call "mental" are on an ontological par with the 
activities of squid, radia tion and bricks; the entities are different onI y 
in organization and complexity.3 
However popular among contemporary philosophers and scien-
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2 One should remember. though, that the terms of physics change with empiri­
cal and tileoretical developments. (d. ].J.e. Smart: "By 'materialism' I mean the 
theory tilat there is nothing in the world over and above those entities which are 
postulated by physics (or, of course, those entities which will be postulated by future 
and more adequate physical theories)" (p. 159, italics mine). 
3 But the "only" here should notbe read as diminutive; these differences should 
not be taken lightly. The human brain is host to over 50 billion neurons and trillions 
of interneuronal connections. For more on the importance of the boggling power of 
the human organ of thought, see Dennett's "Fast Thinking" (IS, pp. 323--337). 
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tists, the dominant strains of physicalism have been resisted by some 
non-dualist theorists as patently wrong or, at best, incomplete.4 
These philosophers fear that the materialist position leaves out 
something important about our nature and in so doing presents an 
incomplete picture of the world. These thinkers challenge the notion 
that contemporary science is able fully to explain the universe, for, 
they claim, the concepts ofmodem science are inprincipIe unable to 
subsume certain facts that we know or intuit to be true-facts which 
center on the mlnd-body problem in philosophy. 
This essay deals with a prominent exponent of this hesitancy 
toward physicalism, Thomas Nagel. In a series of essays and books, 
Nagel has developed his position around the issue of subjectivity. 
The problem is one of opposition between subjective 
and objective points of view. There is a tendency to 
seek an objective account of everything before admit­
ting its reality. But often what appears to a more 
subjective point of view cannot be accounted for in 
this way (MQ, p. 196). 
My work here focuses on evaluating the import for phYSicalism of 
Nagel's concerns about subjectivity. My treatment of the issue 
breaks into two tasks: first, identifying and describing the various 
senses of subjectivity that Nagel finds problematic for physicaJism, 
and second, sketching a possible salve for the quandary elicited by 
each sense. I hope in this way to answer the following question by the 
end of the paper: Does subjectivity pose an intractable problem for a 
modern physicalist worldview? 
My approach relies on the notion that one can make progress on 
even seemingly big problems when steps are taken to identify 
manageabIe parts. By taking those steps in this paper, I hope at least 
to point the way toward an ultimate reconciliation between Nagel's 
notion of subjectivity and physicalism-a useful enterprise even if 
the reader fails to accept my own formulations for this feat. 
4 I shall not deal here with contemporary dualists. I take their positions to be 
obviously untenable for reasons any cursory look at the materialist literature will 
reveaL 
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The first sense: Intraspecies Subjectivity 
OnNagel's view, wemiss somethingwhen we describe a person 
in the objective terms ofphysics. The thing thatphysical descriptions 
leave out is "the internal element ..."which"remains, even if ignored, 
as the true source of persistent dissatisfaction with all physical or 
other external theories of the mind" (MQ, p. 202). Nagel thinks that 
this internal feature of subjective experience "cannotbe captured by 
the purified form of thought suitable for dealing with the physical 
world that underlies the appearances" (VN, p.lS). Subjective expe­
rience for Nagel includes such phenomena as "raw feels" and "inten­
tional mental states" (VN, p. 15). 
So, on a first pass, Nagel seems concerned about what philoso­
phers call "qualia."5 The debate about qualia-the intrinsic proper­
ties of our sense experience which physical descriptions somehow 
cannotcapture-is familiar to all of us. In fact, manyofus discovered 
the "qualia problem" in childhood. If you ever wondered whether 
what you call "red" might be seen as "green" to me, internally, then 
you hit on the puzzle. Or, if you ever found yourself troubled that 
what I call "pain"mightnotfeel the same aswhat youcall "pain," you 
were uncovering a similar difficulty. Even though we might point to 
the same things when we say "red," or we might say we feel "pain" 
in aU the same circumstances (perhaps whenever we have our teeth 
drilled), it seems impossible to saywhether my "red" or "pain" is the 
same-has the same "qualia"-as your "red" or "pain." 
But ifour qualia are not fixed by reference to our behavior, how 
can physics, the science of behavior par excellence, ever capture what 
is it to see "red" or feel "pain"? Even if we possessed full neurophysi­
ological descriptions of the brain states involved in the instantiations 
of these qualia, how would we say in physical terms what it was like 
to "see red" or "feel paln"? In fact this seems what Nagel has inmind 
in asserting tha t 
5 Here I group "raw feels" and "intentional mental states" together. Strictly 
speaking, the term "quale" is used in the literature to refer only to "the intrinsic 
qualitative nature ... that is revealed in introspection" (Churchland, p. 24) of 
sensations. However, I think that much ofwhat seems irreducible to physical terms 
in the notion of "intention" might be characterized in terms of qualia. 
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the subjective character of experience ... is not 
analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of 
functional states, or intentional states, since these 
couldbe ascribed to robots or automata that behaved 
like people although they experienced nothing (WLB, 
p.436). 
The subjectivity problem, then, is first of all an intraspecies 
problem: How can we say anything about the character of our 
subjectivehumanmentalstates-like feeling pain andseeingcolor­
by using the predicates of physics? How could a description like 
"neuron 800,456 is firing- you are seeing red" capture anything 
close to what I mean when I say I see "red"? 
We could answer this question in at least two ways. A first 
possibility is to take the position that, because we cannot say much 
about qualia (try describing what "red" looks like), they prove too 
flimsy and informationally poor to matter to physics (or artificial 
intelligence, by the way). A subset of this view might hold that the 
idea of qualia as entities, as something real, is misguided-there 
really are no such things as "painness" or "redness" left over whenwe 
explainyour "pain feeling" or "red feeling" in terms of your physical 
design and functioning (Dennett takes this view inhis brilliant work 
on consciousness (eE, pp. 369-411». These stances on quaHa are 
ingenious, plausible and perhaps true. But they are also counter­
intuitive and controversiaL Nagel seems correct in saying "our origi­
nal concept [of pain} already picks the thing out by an essential 
feature ..." (VN, p. 47) Ifhe is correct, then we must account for qualia 
in some way, and primajacie we might have to accept Nagel's "a priori 
daim that the mental cannot be reduced to or analyzed in terms of the 
physical" (VN, p. 48). 
As a second way of approaching the qualia problem, suppose 
that Nagel is right about the irreducibility of phenomena like "pain" 
and"redness." Does it follow ilia t physicalism is false or incomp lete? 
The answer seems to be no, and it is helpful to tum to Nagersown 
defirution of physicalism to see why: "I mean by physicalism the 
thesis that a person, with all his psychological attributes, is nothing 
over and above his body, with all its physical attributes" (P, p. 214). 
The tenability of the thesis seems to depend on the class of the 
"physical." If we could expand this class to include such things as 
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"pains"and"redness,"wewouldbeabletoassertaphysicalismwhlch 
coveredmany of the "psychological attributes" Nagel worries about. 
And why not? Many phenomena these days are "physical" 
which our scientific ancestors would have rejected as patently non­
physical or even supernatural. Nagel himself notes this: 
Electricity and magnetism could not be analyzed in 
terms of mechanical concepts of matter in motion. 
...The shift from the universe of Newton to the uni­
verse of Maxwell required the development of a 
whole new set of concepts and theories ... specifically 
devised to describe and explain these newly explored 
phenomena (VN, p. 52). 
Explaining qualia like pain and redness would require new equa­
tions which would explain under what physical conditions the 
qualia-themselves physical-would appear, but this should strike 
one as no more difficult than describing the phenomenon of, say, life. 
Ofcourse, it is a challenge, to understate things a bit, to describe what 
physical conditions produce life. But we have good theories in this 
arena. We know, for example, that mammals require oxygen, water 
and some form offood to supply the raw materials for Jiving; we also 
know much about the processes through which animals use these 
. . 
raw materials and excrete waste products. In addition, we possess 
elaborate cellular theories of the conception find development of 
these organisms. 
"But none ofthat explains 'life,'" rhear a critic say, "It just tells us 
the conditions for life." The last part seems to me a true statement, 
and exactly why science has (or has begun to) "explain" life. We 
"understand" life in a "scientific" way because we know what 
physical conditions must hold for a thing to live, just as we under­
stand ocean waves in a scientific way because we know what 
physical conditi.ons must be satisfied in order for frothy waves to roll 
onto the beach. One could claim that these "explanations" really do 
not get at the "oceanness" or "waveness" of the ocean waves, or the 
"Hfeness" of Hving things, but that would be to misunderstand the 
mission of science. 
Nagel even seems to see the possibility for admitting qualia into 
the world of physics, but he cryptically rejects it: 
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Some may think there is nothing to prevent mental 
phenomena from eventually being recognized as 
physical in their own right. ... It seems to me more 
likely. however, that mental-physical relations will 
eventually be expressed in a theory whose funda­
mental terms cannot be placed clearly in either cat­
egory (WLB. pp. 449-50). 
And what would these new fundamental terms be? Scientific revo­
lution after scientific revolution, we have not failed to call new 
concepts "physical"; why should mental phenomena be party to a 
different fate? 
I do not have the space here for a detailed discussion of the 
philosophy of scientific explanation. Instead. I offer at least a plau­
sible diagnosis ofNagel'shesitancywhenitcomes to "physicalizing" 
qualia. We tend to fall into what I call the "roll, bump. thud" 
characterization of physiCS. According to this view. the identifying 
characteristic of the "physical" is that it is made of "stuff"-stuff that 
goes "roll. bump, thud" or is composed of components which fit this 
description. Tables. bricks. water, atoms andbrains all£allneatlyinto 
this designation of "physical." 
But the problem is that "physics" seems to use a quite different 
conception of "the physical." Instead of the above commonsense 
notion of a "category of composition" (according to which "physical­
ness" is a matter ofw hat somethingismade of). physics seems to rely 
on a "category of predictability" when postulating or describing 
physical objects. Following the boundaries circumscribed by this 
category, physics admits entities into the category "physical" which 
best explain phenomena under observation. For example, X-Rays 
were posited as a physical entity before anyone knew "what they 
were made of" (better: "how to fit them into our present theoretical 
framework or how to change the framework to admit the new 
phenomena"). 
In this way. it seems that we might indeed admit qualia like 
"redness" and "pain" into our physical worldview. All we would 
need would be ways of ordering or systematizing the phenomena 
which we give these labels. Although this would perhaps be a 
humbling task, we already possess the beginnings of this theory (for 
example, I can say with certainty that the quale "pain" will take place 
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in fellow humans with normal nervous systems if a lighted match is 
held next to their skin.6 Of course, what makes this an intraspecies 
problem is thatwe get the data of our new physical pain and redness 
theoriesbybeing members of a type of biological class the members 
ofwhich possess similar physical structure. This similarity of physi­
cal structure allows us to generalize from our experience of "pain" to 
the quality of the experience of another member of the species. 
At this point, it might prove helpful to step back and summarize 
the analYSis so far. First I claimed that Nagel's problem with subjec­
tivity on the intraspecies level has something to do with the apparent 
futility of describing qualia in physical terms. Next I showed how­
even if we accept the commonsense notions of "pains" and "color 
qualities" as "real" instead of dismissing them as misguided or 
trivial-qualia can plausibly be "physicalized. "7 But ifqualia pose no 
threat to physicalism, what is left of the intraspecies subjectivity 
problem? 
Something does seem to be left. After looking at my analysis of 
qualia, someone will say, "But surely my experience as a human is 
not composed just of qualia-these are too simple to describe the 
richness ofmysubjective experience. How could a physics-€ven one 
that admitted qualia-explain all that richness"? 
I will attempt to shake the intuitive significance of this residual 
richness by introducing two further concerns linked to intraspecies 
subjectivity: the first deals with the nature of human subjective ex­
perience, and thesecondisanotherpoint about scientific exp]ana tion. 
The first point begins wi th an explana tion of a phenomenon I cn11 
the "intermodal fallacy."s Although it may be surprising, the degree 
to which our sense experience seems subjective is related to which 
Q I know this because even Nagel, who hilS doubts about the complete/JeSs of 
physicalism, can contradict physicalism only ilt the risk of absurdity. That is, he 
would not want to claim that structurally congruent physical entities subjected to 
identical stimuli could harbor significantly different reactions. To claim that they 
could would be to take stock in nn intervening variable-and whnt would it be? 
"Mind stuff" is not an a ttrnctiv€ answer for NageL 
7We mightnotwantto take this route, of course-thedemands mightprove too 
taxing. I just want to point out the possibility for this avenue, which is more than 
Nagel will allow. 
S Recently I found that Dennett makes an observation along the Silme lines (CE, 
pp. 380-81); however, he makes the point in passing and seems not to give the 
phenomenon the credit I think it deserves. 
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sense modality we talk about; some sensory channels seem to give us 
more "objective" data than others do. For example, imagine visiting 
anart gallery with a friend. On the wall hangs a large oil painting by 
Salvador Dali. You talk with your friend about the symbolism of the 
wilted trees and fancifulhuman-like figures, and discuss everything 
from the role of shading inDali's presentation to the importance of 
the play of various types of angles in the work. But then your friend 
has an idea. "No one is around, so why don'twe seehow the painting 
feels?" The ensuing conversation is markedly impoverished. 
- "It feels ... well, it feels 'rough' here and 'smooth' 
here." 
- "No, it feels more 'grainy' than 'rough.'" 
- "Yes, well, how do you know what 'rough' feels 
like to me?" 
Far from treating Dali's "aesthetics of touch," your conversation 
never gets off the ground. And, curiously, whereas your discussion I 
about what you see runs only into problems of differences in artistic 
judgment, your discussion of tactile impressions turns into a full­
blownmetaphysical quagmire; in fact, it is the problem of qualia all 
over again. One sense modality seems more objective than another, I 
buthowisthispossible?Are not all the senses on one ontological par? ' 
Why do they seem to admit different degrees of subjectivity? 
Many explanations suggest themselves, but I will deal only with 
two of the most obvious. First, human vision has a finer "grain" than I 
human touch. Each normalhuman retina is host to about 132 million 
photoreceptors linked in an elaborate network of connecting cells 
(Foley and Matlin, p. 59). However, the human hand has the benefit 
of only several thousand receptors for touch (Foley and Matlin, p. 
370). Second-and this is probably a corollary to the physiology of 
vision and touch-the human visual vocabulary seems much larger 
than the human tactile vocabulary. These possibilities corroborate a 
larger point: perhaps our sense of subjectivity exhibits an inverse 
relationship with the richness of the sensory data to which we have 
access. If this is the case, the intraspecies subjectivity problem might 
have to do more with weak sensory vocabularies and apparatuses 
than with an ontological dilemma. 
An analysis of the intermodal fallacy thus poses the following 
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interesting idea: if lack of a rich sensory vocabulary is much of the 
intraspecies subjectivity problem, we might be able to eliminate it 
altogether by admitting our sense qualia to the physical world and 
developing sophisticated new "vocabularies"-in the form of com­
plex descriptions of the physical conditions for the phenomena. This 
program would indeed seem possible. 
However, one still might object that this program of systematiz­
ing intra species qualia must in principle still miss much of the 
complexity of human perceptual experience. "Surely," one might 
say, "the richness of my experience is not captured in my vocabu­
lary-even in my relatively rich visual vocabulary." This critic 
would of course be absolutely correct, but with no Significant conse­
quence for a physical theory of perceptual experience; explaining 
this point requires a discussion of another interesting observation 
about scientific explanation. 
When it comes to talking about our perceptions, we seem to 
employ two senses of "experience," E(l) and E(2): 
E(l): A clear yet incomplete notion 

E(2): A rich, complete, yet vague notion 

When we look at a "red" car and see "redness," when we see a clock 
and notice that it appears "round," or when we hit our thumb with 
a hammer and feel "a throbbing pain," we are employing the concept 
"experience" in the first sense. Tha t is. what we notice and are able to 
say about the phenomenon is (relatively) clear, but does not exhaust 
the "wholeness" of the experience-we cannot seem to say enough to 
do justice to what we "experience" in the second sense of experience. 
E(l) is the sense of experience that the preceding analysis of 
qualia proposes to physicalize through gradual physical vocabulary 
building. E(2) is the sense of experience not fully covered by even the 
best physical explanation of the phenomena of perception. We 
should be ready to admit that experience in the E(2) sense actually 
exists;9 however, does this spell the demise of the possibility of a 
physical explanation of our experience? 
9 But see Dennett (CE, passim) for plausible evidence thatwe are mistaken abou t 
the richness of out perceptual experience. Trying to concede as much as possible to 
the pretheoretical notion of experience, I do not argue Dennett's hard line here. 
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No. Not all physical objects are the objects of physics. As men­
tioned above, physics does not propose to explain the "oceanness" of 
ocean waves, or the "lifeness" of living things. If this were the case, 
science would have on its hands quite a task: in order to prove itself 
"complete" to its critics, it would have to describe the uniqueness of 
every possible combination of physical phenomena in the world­
everything from "a ruffle-feathered cardinal perched atop the oak 
writing desk in the second room on the left" to "the pitted plastic 
button on the shirt I wore when I visited the huge mansion onFourth 
Street." Modem physical explanations of these examples-posed in 
terms of arrangements of atoms and forces which hold between 
them-do not describe the phenomena's richness, but this is some­
thing that we can live with. Physics attempts to explain phenomena 
in terms of their physical parts, not to describe them in their entirety. 
In fact, the simplicity of physical explanation seems to be one of its 
most powerful traits. Although rich, vague experience in the E(2) 
sense might exist, the fact that it is difficult for physicalist science to 
describe this experience takes nothing away from phYSicalism. 
Sense two: Interspecies Subjectivity 
We have investigated a plausible route for the solution of the 
intraspecies subjectivity problem. Strangely, although Nagel seems 
at times apprehensive about such a physical, objective account of 
humanmental states, at times he seems amenable to the idea. Infact, 
he even claims that 
There is a sense inwhich phenomenological facts are 
perfectly objective: one person can know or say of 
another what the quality of the other's experience is 
[But], They are subjective ... in the sense that even this 
objective ascription of experience is possible only for 
someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascrip­
tion to be able to adopt his point of view ... (WLB, p. 
442). 
Remember that the above solution for the intraspecies problem 
hinges on the fact that we can know about other members of our 
species' experience in virtue of our structural (physical) similarities. 
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It seems that Nagel, despite his caveats about the problematic nature 
of intraspecies subjectivity, has been ready all along to admit the 
possibility for physicalizing human experience in this way. Nagel's 
stronger case rests on the problem of interspedes subjectivity. 
Without similar physiological structures, it is impossible for one 
organism to know "what it is like to be" the other organism, in 
Nagel's terms. Inperhaps his mostfamous article, "What is it Like to 
Be a Bat?" Nagel argues that because humans and other creatures­
bats, for example-have wildly different types of perceptual appara­
tus, humans cannot in principle know "what it is like to be a bat." 
From this observation, the philosopher goes on to argue that 
This bears directly on the mind-body problem. For if 
the facts of experience-facts about what it is like for 
the experiencing organism-are accessible only from 
one point of view, then it is a mystery how the true 
character of experiences could be revealed in the 
physical operation of that organism (WLB, p. 442). 
An explanation of bat experience seems to be aU that stands in the 
way of a full-blown physicalism, 
We can approach the interspecies problem in several ways, 
Perhaps the most plausible answer to Nagel's concern that physics 
cannot describe "what it is like to be a bat" is to say that physics 
actually does describe bat experience in a rough way, This approach 
is stressed by Dennett: 
[Physiological and behavioral] investigations would 
show us a great deal about what a bat could and could 
not be conscious of under various conditions, by 
showing us what provisions there were in their ner­
vous systems for representing this and that, and by 
checking experimentally to make sure the bat actu­
ally put the information tousein the modulation of Us 
behavior (eE, p, 444). 
Of course, one could read this approachlO as building directly on 
10 Although Dennett would not-remember. he is not a "realist" about our 
pretheoretical notions of experience. 
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the framework for dealing with intraspecies subjectivity that we 
erected in the last section: because humans know what "sensing" is 
like-even if humans do not possess a sonar sensory modality­
humans can at least understand the rudiments ofbat experience. In 
this way, humans can use the structural descriptions of bats pro­
vided by the sciences of biology and physics to extrapolate from 
human experience to bat experience. 
But, surely, we still do not know exactly what it is "like" to be a 
bat-evenifwehavea roughsense of what itmightbe like. But is this 
a problem for physicalism? Is there something in the bat point of 
view which physics-as we now understand it-is unable to ex­
plain? The answer is both yes and no. 
At first glance, there is nothing about physicalism that blocks it 
from including bat experience. In fact. deSCriptions of bat physiol­
ogy, as Dennett points out, are pretty good rough descriptions of 
what it is like to be a bat. However, there is still a difficulty, but the 
problemis nothing more (orlessl) than this: Ahumancannotbeabat. 
In the end, Nagel's argument against physicalism seems to turn 
on this one statement. Indeed, if one has to be a bat in order to know 
what it is like to be a bat, and there is no way for a human to be a bat, 
we are stuck. But this seems strangely tautological. Ofcourse ahuman 
cannot be a bat! Can a square be a circle? Can a mountain be a lake? 
Can a car be a train? In short, Nagel's observation that we cannot 
directly know "what bat experience is like" is presupposed by the 
very physicalism he thinks problematic. It is a commonly known 
axiom of physics (or of logic), after all, that one type of thing cannot 
be another at the same time; this is just obvious. 
Thus, when we stop to take a good look at Nagel's seemingly 
startling observation that in trying to imagine bat consciousness "I 
am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources 
are inadequate to the task" (WLB, p. 439), we see both that this 
statement is tautological and that the best way to explain why our human 
minds are inadequate is to use a physical, structural explanation. 
Conclusion: A Toast to Physicalism 
Through a careful analYSis of Nagel's arguments for the inad­
equacy of physicalism, we find that the "problem of subjectivity" 
involves not one but several problems, involving various assump­
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tions about the character of perceptual phenomena, the claims of 
physicalismand the nature of physical explanation. We see that once 
our intuitions about the problem of intraspecies subjectivity are 
assuaged, the interspecies subjectivity problem seems either dimin­
ished or completely misguided. 
Thinking of our universe-all of it-in physical terms seems to 
hold the most promise for explaining even the most mysterious 
phenomena. I hope that this paper serves to help point the way for 
physicalism to surmount the difficulties posedbyNagel's analysis of 
subjectivity. Here's to the continued success of physicalist explana­
tions of the world. ll 
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